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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-Securities and Exchange Com-
mission's Determinations Governing Security Holders'
Proxy Proposals Held Subject to Judicial Review.
The Medical Committee for Human Rights acquired five shares of
Dow Chemical Company stock by gift. On March 11, 1968, the
Committee wrote to the Secretary of Dow requesting that a resolution
to amend the charter of Dow Chemical be sent to the shareholders.
The proposed amendment sought to place a limitation upon the corpo-
ration's sale of napalm.' The Committee stated that their objection
was based on concern for human life, but that it had also been in-
formed by its investment advisors that the sale of napalm was detri-
mental to the company's business.2 Copies of this letter were for-
warded to the President and General Counsel of Dow Chemical Com-
pany and to the Securities and Exchange Commission.3
On March 21, 1968, the General Counsel of Dow sent a return
1. RESOLVED, that the shareholders of the Dow Chemical Company request
the Board of Directors, in accordance with the laws of the State of Delaware,
and the Composite Certificate of Incorporation of the Dow Chemical Com-
pany, to adopt a resolution setting forth an amendment to the Composite
Certificate of Incorporation of the Dow Chemical Company that napalm shall
not be sold to any buyer unless that buyer gives reasonable assurance that
the substance will not be used on or against human beings.
2. The letter concluded,
It is now clear from company statements and press reports that it is in-
creasingly hard to recruit the highly intelligent, well-motivated, young college
men so important for company growth. There is, as well, an adverse impact
on our global business, which our advisors indicate, suffers as a result of the
public reaction to this product.
3. The statutory basis for the federal regulation of proxy solicitations was estab-
1shed by section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78n(a)
(1964) which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a na-
tional securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the
use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of
any security (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to section
12 of this title.
Pursuant to its rule making authority delegated by the section, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission has promulgated Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8 which governs
the proposals of security holders. Rule 14-8(a) provides in part:
If any security holder entitled to vote at a meeting of security holders of the
issuer shall submit to the management of the issuer, within the time hereinaf-
ter specified, a proposal which is accompanied by notice of his intention to
present the proposal for action at the meeting, the management shall set forth
the proposal in its proxy statement and shall identify it in its form of proxy
and provide means by which security holders can make the specification
provided for by Rule 14a-4(b).
200
Case Comments
letter advising the Medical Committee that the proposal was received
too late for inclusion in the 1968 proxy statement, but that the mat-
ter would be considered for inclusion in the 1969 proxy materials sent
to the shareholders. A copy of this letter was filed with the Commis-
sion.
Subsequently, on January 17, 1969, the Secretary of Dow Chemi-
cal informed the Medical Committee that Dow intended to omit the
resolution from its proxy statement, and enclosed an opinion memo-
randum from Dow's General Counsel. In that memorandum he stated
that it was his opinion that the proposal related to the ordinary busi-
ness operations of the Company, and was one motivated primarily by
a general political, social, or similar cause.4 On February 3, 1969,
the Medical Committee responded to Dow's General Counsel, con-
tending that he had misconstrued the nature of their proposal in his
memorandum and submitted a revised proposal to prohibit the manu-
facture of napalm. 5
On the same date, the Committee sent a letter to the Securities and
Exchange Commission requesting a staff review of Dow's decision if it
refused to submit the revised proposal to the shareholders and oral ar-
gument before the Commission if the staff agreed with Dow's decision.
Shortly thereafter, Dow informed the Medical Committee and the
Commission by letter that it intended to omit the proposal from its
proxy statement for the reasons indicated in their letter of January 17.
Soon after a letter was sent to Dow by the Commission's Chief Coun-
sel of the Division of Corporate Finance stating that the Division
would not recommend any action be taken if the proposal were omit-
ted.
The Medical Committee requested a review by the Commission of
the decision in a letter and submitted a memorandum of legal argu-
ments supporting the resolutions and challenging the Division's deci-
4. Rule 14a-8(c)(2), 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(c)(2) permits management to omit a
proposal if it clearly appears that the proposal is submitted by the security holder
primarily for the purpose of enforcing a personal claim . . . against the issuer or pri-
marily for the purpose of promoting general economic, political, racial, religious, social
or similar cause.
Rule 14a-8(c)(5), 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(c)(5) permits management to omit a proposal
if the proposal consists of a recommendation or request that the management take ac-
tion with respect to a matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary business opera-
tions of the issuer.
5. RESOLVED, that the shareholders of the Dow Chemical Company request
that the Board of Directors, in accordance with the laws (sic) of the Dow
Chemical Company, consider the advisability of adopting a resolution setting
forth an amendment to the Composite Certificate of Incorporation of the Dow
Chemical Company that the company shall not make napalm.
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sion recommending no action be taken. Finally, on April 2, 1969,
both the Medical Committee and Dow were informed by letter that the
Commission had approved the recommendation of the Division of
Corporation Finance.
On May 29, 1969, the Medical Committee filed a petition to re-
view the order of the Securities and Exchange Commission in the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The
Commission's motion to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction
was denied.
The court was confronted with three issues bearing on its jurisdic-
tion to review. The first issue was whether the review was timely
sought. The second issue was whether there was a reviewable order
at all. Finally, assuming that review was proper, the third issue con-
cerned the determination of the scope of review.
On these jurisdictional issues, the Court of Appeals held: (1) that
the petition of the Medical Committee had been timely filed because
the period for review did not begin to run until the Medical Committee
had been given adequate notice; (2) that there was a reviewable order
because the Commission's procedural regulations governing proxy pro-
posals are possessed of sufficient adversariness and formality to render
its final proxy determinations amenable to judicial review, and because
the Medical Committee was aggrieved for purposes of the Act; and
(3) that the court was authorized to conduct a limited review to exam-
ine the validity of the legal framework within which the administrative
discretion was exercised.
Having decided that the court had limited jurisdiction to review the
agency determination the court concluded that on the present state of
the record it was unable to determine the legal basis for the Commis-
sion's action and therefore remanded the cause to the Commission "for
a more illuminating consideration and decision. "6
The decision in Medical Committee for Human Rights v. Securities
and Exchange Commission7 is significant because it marks the first
time that the Commission's determinations governing security holder's
proxy proposals have been subjected to judicial review. On its face it
appears that the Court of Appeals has facilitated the procedure for a
security holder with few shares and limited resources who seeks inclu-
sion of proxy proposals in management's proxy materials. On a
6. 432 F.2d 659, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
7. 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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broader basis, the court's conclusion that a Commission determination
without a formal hearing is sufficiently formal and adversary in nature
to support judicial review may provide support for an increased activ-
ity by the courts in overseeing administrative action.
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals was based on section
25(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which provides in
part:
Any person aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission
in a proceeding under this title to which such person is a party
may obtain a review of such order . . . in the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia, by filing in such court,
within sixty days after the entry of such order, a written peti-
tion praying that the order of the Commission be modified or
set aside in whole or in part.8
The first objection raised by the Commission was that the Court of
Appeals was without jurisdiction because the Medical Committee had
failed to file its petition for review within sixty days after entry of the
Commission order. Relying upon section 22(k) of its Rules of
Practice, 9 the Commission contended that the date of entry of the al-
leged order was the date that the Commission decided not to take ac-
tion with regard to the proposal. The decision regarding the petition-
er's proxy proposal was made on March 24, 1969, and on that date
the petitioner was notified of that decision by telephone. Since the
petitioner did not file its petition until May 29, 1969, which was 66
days later, the Commission concluded that the petition was untimely.
The court, however, noted that the petitioner did not receive any
written information concerning the Commission's decision until a letter
was mailed to them on April 2. The court stated that:
Rule 22(k) together with the 60 day statutory period for
filing petitions for review, evidences an attempt by Congress
and the Commission to strike a balance between the need to
have Commission orders operate with finality, and the ag-
grieved party's need to have both adequate notice of the sub-
stance of the decision, and sufficient time to prepare his
petition.10
8. 15 U.S.C. 78y(a) (1964).
9. Section 22(k), 17 C.F.R. 201.22(k) (1970) provides:
In computing any period of time involving the date of the entry of an orderby the Commission, the date of the entry shall be (1) the date of the adop-
tion of the order by the Commission . . . or (2) in the case of orders reflect-
ing action taken pursuant to delegated authority, the date when such action is
taken .... The order shall be available for inspection by the public from
and after the date of entry by any person entitled to inspect it.
10. 432 F.2d at 665.
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The court viewed the telephone call to petitioner as insufficient for this
purpose and decided that the date written notice was sent more ade-
quately reflects the intent of Congress. Since 60 days had not elapsed
since the letter was mailed, the court concluded that the petition was
not barred by reason of untimeliness.
The next issue the court considered was whether the Commission's
determination not to take action should Dow decide to omit the Med-
ical Committee's proposal was a reviewable order. Relying on the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner," the court restated the principle that there is a strong pre-
sumption in favor of the court's power to review administrative action.
Despite the strong presumption in favor of judicial review, the court
recognized that the Congressional intent underlying an act may never-
theless preclude judicial review of administrative action.' 2 The Com-
mission reasoned that since the Securities Exchange Act contains vari-
ous sections where provisions for adjudicatory proceedings involving
the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing are set forth, l" and since
section 14a of the Act, which provides for proxy solicitations does not
provide for an evidentiary hearing; Congress did not intend for there
to be judicial review of the Commission's proxy determinations.
The court, however, noted that neither sections 14a nor 25a ex-
pressly exclude review, nor is there any indication in the legislative his-
tory of the Act that Congress so intended. The court was not con-
vinced that Congressional failure to provide for evidentiary hearings in
proxy matters indicated an intent to preclude review.' 4
The Commission, however, further contended that the very language
of section 25a precludes judicial review. It argued that, within the
meaning of the statute, the Medical Committee did not qualify as an
aggrieved person, the Commission's no-action letter was not an order,
11. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
12. Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666 (1960).
13. See, Securities Exchange Act Sections 6, 15 U.S.C. 78f (grant or denial of
registration as a national securities exchange), 12(f), 15 U.S.C. 781(f) (termination
or suspension of enlisted trading privileges on a national securities exchange), 15(b)
(5), 15 U.S.C. 78o(b)(5) (denial or revocation of registration as a broker-dealer),
and 19(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. 78s(a)(1) (suspension or withdrawal of registration of a
national securities exchange).
14. The court cited Professor Jaffe:
The mere fact that some acts are made reviewable should not suffice to
support an implication of exclusion as to others. The right to review is too im-
portant to be excluded on such slender and indeterminate evidence of legis-
lative intent.
L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 346, 357 (1965).
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and finally, the procedure that had been followed in issuing the no
action letter did not constitute a proceeding.
The court found that "whether a particular action is a reviewable or-
der can be subdivided into two general categories."'" The first con-
sideration was whether the administrative action operated with final
effect upon a particular individual, entity, or group. From this deter-
mination the court could infer that the Medical Committee had stand-
ing to sue, or was aggrieved for purposes of section 25a. The second
consideration concerned the formalities surrounding the administrative
action because the statutory terms "order" and "proceeding" suggest
some formal characteristics. 6 In viewing these two criteria the court
emphasized that pragmatic considerations would prevail over purely
doctrinal arguments against reviewability.
Turning first to the question of standing or aggrievement, the court
considered the final effect of the Commission's order upon the Medical
Committee. Recognizing that the action ended the proceedings before
the Commission, there was no difficulty in the determination that the or-
der was final. The problem was in determining whether it had the nec-
essary adverse effect upon the Committee. It was contended that the
effect was not adverse because the Medical Committee still had the op-
tion of instituting a private action against Dow in the appropriate dis-
trict court. Thus it had an available alternate cause of action. The ef-
fect of such an alternate course of action upon the question of ag-
grievement has been considered by the cases of Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardnerl" and Isbrandtsen v. United States.8 In Abbott, a group
of drug manufacturers sought declaratory and injunctive relief against
regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of Food and Drugs.
The regulations required that drug labels and advertising designate the
established name of the drug every time its trade name was used.
However, the regulations had not been enforced against the plaintiffs
prior to the time the suit was filed. The Supreme Court in Abbott
found that the regulations operated with final effect upon the petition-
ers because they had only two equally onerous alternatives open to
them. If they wished to comply with the regulations, they would have
to incur sizable expenses because they would have to change all their
labels, advertisements, and promotional materials; and in addition, de-
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15. 432 F.2d at 666.
16. Id. at 667. See also L. Jaffe op. cit. 419.
17. See n. 11, supra.
18. 211 F.2d 51 cert. denied, 347 U.S. 990 (1954).
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stroy all stocks of printed matter, and invest heavily in new supplies.
The alternative to compliance risked criminal and civil penalties for the
unlawful distribution of misbranded drugs.
Isbrandtsen involved a petition by an independent steamship line to
review an order of the Federal Maritime Board permitting a proposed
dual rate system of an association of competing steamship lines to go
into effect before the petitioner had an opportunity for a hearing. The
Board insisted that in declining to hold a hearing before the rates went
into effect, it took only interlocutory action of a discretionary nature
such as is not ordinarily reviewable.1 9 The court found that the ac-
tion by the Board operated with final effect upon the petitioner be-
cause by the denial of the request for an immediate hearing, the Board
would cause petitioner to suffer "real, immediate, and incalculable
harm."2 0
It would appear that where the alternative course of action imposes
additional difficulties upon the parties seeking review, such parties will
be considered aggrieved for purposes of judicial review.
Relying primarily on the final effect of the Commission's decision
upon the Medical Committee, the court in the instant case found that
the Medical Committee was aggrieved for purposes of section 25(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act,21 notwithstanding the fact that it still
had the right to institute a private action against Dow in a federal dis-
trict court.2" The court stated two reasons for this conclusion: (1)
because the Medical Committee had undergone a two-stage adminis-
trative proceeding compelled by the risk that failure to do so would
preclude any judicial relief and, therefore, had its recourse to an au-
thoritative judicial determination delayed; (2) because the Medical
Committee would have the added burden in a private action of over-
coming an adverse Committee determination.23
The court based its conclusion that the Medical Committee had
19. Id. at 55.
20. Id. at 56. Isbrandtsen, who carried almost 1/3 of shipping volume in the area,
was the only non-member competing with the association. Under the proposed rate
system, shippers who refused to agree in writing to employ Isbrandtsen's competitors
exclusively would be charged, for the same transportation and service, tariffs which
were nine and one-half percent higher than those charged shippers who had executed
agreements with the competitors. Once this contract had been entered into, a single
shipment with Isbrandtsen would result in the shipper's being required to pay the
association, as liquidated damages, fifty percent of the freight charge which the shipper
would have paid had such shipment been made in an association vessel.
21. 15 U.S.C. 78y(a) (1964).
22. See, J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
23. 432 F.2d at 667.
206
Vol. 2: 200
Case Comments
been compelled to undergo a two-stage administrative proceeding on
Peck v. Greyhound.24 The plaintiff in Peck, who was the owner of
three shares of stock in the defendant corporation, sought a temporary
injunction against the defendant from soliciting proxies and from hold-
ing an upcoming stockholder's meeting. The plaintiff had requested
that his proposal entitled "A Recommendation that Management Con-
sider the Advisability of Abolishing the Segregated Seating System in
the South," be included in management's proxy materials. The de-
fendant corporation notified the plaintiff and the Commission that it
intended to exclude the proposal because it was not a proper subject
for action by shareholders as it dealt with matters which were of a gen-
eral political, social or economic nature. The Commission directed
the Assistant Director of Corporation Finance of the Commission to
advise the corporation that the proposal need not be included in its
proxy materials. The district court denied the motion for a temporary
injunction because in the court's opinion the plaintiff had not pursued
the available administrative remedies to obtain a review by the Com-
mission of the interpretation of the Assistant Director.25 But since
the facts indicate that the Commission had already passed upon the
merits of the plaintiff's proposal, it is not clear what further @tction
Peck could have taken within the administrative structure. Neverthe-
less, it would appear that the Court of Appeals in the instant case at
least inferentially indicated that one who has been notified of a staff
no action recommendation must seek relief from the Commission be-
fore instituting an action in a federal district court.26
As support for its conclusion that the Medical Committee had been
aggrieved because it had incurred the burden of overcoming an adverse
Commission determination, the court cited Union Pacific R. Co. v.
Chicago & N.W. R. Co.21 which holds that the Commission's interpre-
24. 97 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
25. Id. at 681.
26. The decision in Peck has been criticized as a "good example of the court's
misunderstanding of the Commission's informal review procedures." Aranow and
Einhorn, Proxy Contests for Corporate Control, 465 n.9 (2d ed. 1968). Although the
commentators do not elaborate, it can be inferred that they were referring to the court's
adoption of the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine because as they point
out, "the total lack in the internal rules of the Commission for any procedures per-
mitting review by the Commissioner of a staff member's determination that a given
matter is (or is not) a violation, no meaningful exhaustion of administrative remedies
could be accomplished," at 465. The validity of the Peck holding is doubtful in light
of the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, supra n. 22, which
guarantees the shareholder's right to institute a private action against the company in a
federal district court as a supplement to Commission enforcement. The holding in
Case does not require the shareholder to seek relief from the Commission before he
institutes his action against the company.
27. 226 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
207
1971
Loyola University Law Journal Vol. 2: 200
tation of its rules is entitled to judicial deference. In determining what
weight should be given to the Commission's failure to take action, the
Union Pacific court pointed out a distinction between the situation
where the Commission permits the filing of information but fails to
take any action, in which case the failure to take action would not
carry any weight, and the situation,
[W]here as here, circumstances assure that agency considera-
tion has been given to the merits of a question in which case
the determinations and positions of the responsible authorities
of the S.E.C. carry significant weight and command deference in
the courts. 2s
For the principle set forth in Union Pacific to have any validity
here, the Court of Appeals had to find some indication that there had
been a legal interpretation of the proxy rules by the Commission. It
is possible that the court found its evidence in the letter of the Com-
mission's Chief Counsel of the Division of Corporation Finance to
Dow in which he stated that "for reasons stated in your letter and the
accompanying opinion of counsel . . . this Division will not recom-
mend any action." The Commission approved this recommendation.
If this approval by the Commission would be considered by a district
court to be a legal determination then that court would give deference
to the Commission's interpretation. Thus the Medical Committee
would incur an additional burden supporting the court's determination
that the Committee was an aggrieved party.
Having determined that the Commission's action operated with final
effect, and that therefore the Medical Committee was aggrieved for
purposes of section 25a, the court proceeded to determine whether the
Commission's decision possessed sufficient formality to be a review-
able order.
The necessity for a formal action is also inherent in the language of
section 25a, which requires a "proceeding." The Commission argued
that the informal nature of their proxy opinions do not give rise to a
proceeding.29
28. Id. at 406.
29. This view had been outlined in the Letter of Byron D. Woodside, Director of
the Commission's Division of Corporation Finance (52-56 Transfer Binder) CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. Ch. 90, 659 (March 4, 1954) at 92,002.
The circumstances surrounding the letter were similar to the circumstances in the
present case. The shareholder to whom the letter was written had requested that the
Commission take steps to compel management to include the shareholder's proposal in
management's proxy materials. After the filing of opposing statements by shareholders
and management, and the hearing of statements in support of the proposal, the Com-
mission ultimately reached the conclusion that it would not object if the company de-
208
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The Commission further contended that Rule 14a-8 did no more
than establish a standard concerning shareholder proposals to which
management must conform and, through a filing requirement, provide
a means by which the Commission could judge the necessity for en-
forcement action.A° The Commission, stated that its consideration of
evidence submitted and arguments by interested parties, and the cour-
tesy of a response to a complaining party, did not turn an exercise of
discretion into an adjudication, convert the complainant into a party
to a proceeding, or transform the Commission's determination not to
bring an enforcement action into an "order" of the Commission by
which the complainant is aggrieved. 31
Although no case had expressly so held, it had been generally as-
sumed that the Commission's proxy determinations did not give rise to
a formal reviewable proceeding. For example, in Klastorin v. Roth,3 2
there is dicta to the effect that review by the Commission of proxy
material under Rule 14 is merely informal in nature. 3 Legal com-
mentators have been in general agreement with this opinion. 4
Nevertheless, the court found that the procedure presented in Rule
14a-8 was possessed of enough formality to render the determina-
tion of the Commission reviewable. The court pointed out that the
procedures denominated "informal" by the Commission generally in-
volve negotiation between the Commission and one private party, and
normally culminate in a letter of advice to the party from a Commis-
sion staff member. In the case of the stockholder proxy proposals,
there are two interested private parties, management and the share-
holder.
The added formality brought about by having adverse parties was a
termined to exclude the proposal from its proxy materials. The Commission noted
that nothing the Commission had done had in any way prejudiced the right of the peti-
tioner to institute an original action against the company in a federal district court to
test the correctness of its proposal. Finally, the Commission stated that, "Reviewable
orders under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are only those which are entered in
a proceeding under the Act to which the person seeking review has been a party."
Id. at 92,003.
30. Answering Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission at 14.
31. Id. at 19.
32. 358 F.2d 182 (2d Cir. 1965).
33. Id. at 183, n. 2.
34. Clusserath, "The Amended Stockholder Proposal Rule: a Decade Later,"
40 N.D. Law. 13, 17 (1964).
Rather these decisions must be understood in their context as informal ad-
ministrative determinations not directly subject to review by Courts of Ap-
peal.
See also, p. 43, Aranow and Einhom, Proxy Contests for Corporate Control, supra,
n. 26; I1 Loss, Securities Regulation 1896 (1961), as supplemented VI Loss at 4026
(1969); 1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, Section 4.09 (1958).
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significant distinction. The court was further influenced by a Com-
mission release concerning rule 14a-8 which stated that the rule
places the burden of proof upon management to show that a particular
security holder's proposal is not a proper one for inclusion in manage-
ment's proxy material.83 The Commission contended that neither the
release nor the rule indicated that the burden should be upon manage-
ment in an administrative proceeding before the Commission. The
court disregarded the Commission's contention and concluded that the
Commission's procedural regulations governing proxy proposals incor-
porate the basic theory of an adversary encounter.
Having decided that the Commission's procedures possess sufficient
attributes of finality and formality to warrant judicial review of final
proxy determinations, the court had little difficulty with the fact that
the Commission's decision was couched in terms of "no-action" rather
than in the form of a decree binding a party to perform or refrain from
some particular act."6 Quoting Rochester Telephone Corporation v.
United States,37 the court stated:
An order of the Commission dismissing a complaint on the
merits and maintaining the status quo is an exercise of ad-
ministrative function, no more and no less, than an order di-
recting some change in status.38
The court found further support for its argument in section 10(e) of
the Administrative Procedure Act which provides judicial relief for
"agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed."39  The
court recognized that failure to act might involve a permissible exer-
cise of administrative discretion, and that review might be precluded
for that reason, but implied that failure to act, in and of itself, would
not preclude judicial review, if that inaction operated with final effect
upon the petitioner.
The court next turned to the question of whether a district court,
where a private enforcement action would be filed, was a more appro-
priate forum for the adjudication of the petitioner's claim than the
Court of Appeals. The case that firmly established the right of a pri-
vate party to institute an action against his corporation for a violation
of the Securities Exchange Act was J.I. Case Co. v. Borak.40
35. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4979 (Jan. 6, 1954), 19 Fed. Reg. 246
(Jan. 14, 1954).
36. 432 F.2d at 668.
37. 307 U.S. 125 (1939).
38. Id. at 141.
39. 5 U.S.C. 706(1) (Supp. V, 1965-69).
40. See, n. 22, supra.
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The United States Supreme Court ruled that while the language of
14(a) makes no specific reference to a private right of action, among
its chief purposes is the "protection of investors" which implies the
availability of judicial relief where necessary to achieve that result.41
Since section 2742 grants the district court jurisdiction of all suits in
equity or actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created
under the Act, the Court concluded that private parties have a right
under section 27 to bring suit for violation of section 14(a) of the
Act.
Relying primarily upon pragmatic considerations in favor of review-
ability, and purporting to follow the rationale of the Supreme Court in
Case, the Court of Appeals concluded that the district court was not a
more appropriate forum. The court noted that the petitioner did not
seek any relief which was peculiarly within the competence of the dis-
trict court; but merely sought to have the cause remanded so that the
Commission, in accordance with proper standards, could make an en-
lightened determination of whether enforcement action would be ap-
propriate. Furthermore, the court stated that it saw no practical or
theoretical virtues in commanding a course of action which "would re-
sult in equal inconvenience" to the petitioners, the Commission, and
the overcrowded courts, and "would constitute circuitous routes for the
determination of issues easily and directly determinable by review in
this court."4  Finally, the court felt that by allowing review in the
Court of Appeals, it was furthering the intent of Congress to aid the
small investor by making the Commission look carefully at the merits
of the shareholder's proposal.
The primary purpose of section 14(a) is the protection of
the investors and the primary method of implementing this goal is
through Commission regulation of proxy statements not through
private actions by individual security holders.44
Thus, using the rationale of the Supreme Court in Case, the protection
of investors, the Court of Appeals determined that the remedy pro-
vided by Case does not always afford the investor sufficient protection.
The final objection of the Commission to the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals was that the Commission's decisions as to whether
enforcement procedures should be instituted are wholly discretionary 45
41. Id. at 432.
42. 15 U.S.C. 78aa.
43. 432 F.2d at 668.
44. Id. at 672.
45. 5 U.S.C. 701(a), 702, which provides:
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and not subject to judicial review under section 10 of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act.
There are two prevailing interpretations of section 10. The first is
espoused by Professor Davis.46 He contends that:
So far as the action is by law "committed" to agency dis-
cretion, it is not reviewable---even for arbitrariness or abuse
of discretion; it is not committed to agency discretion to the
extent that it is reviewable.4 7
In other words, some discretion is reviewable for abuse and some is
not. Whether the discretion is reviewable depends upon whether the
statute involved requires or only permits the exercise of discretion. If
the agency's decision is pursuant to a permissive type statute the discre-
tion is not reviewable for abuse. If, on the other hand, the decision
was required to be made, it would be reviewable even though it in-
volved the exercise of some degree of discretion.4" Since section 2119
of the Securities Exchange Act, which governs the Commission's dis-
cretion to investigate and prosecute, is phrased in broad permissive
terms, it seems that under the Davis interpretation of section 10 of
the Administrative Procedure Act, the Commission's determinations
not to take action under the proxy rules would not be subject to re-
view by the Court of Appeals--even for arbitrariness.
A second interpretation is espoused by Professor Berger." He in-
terprets the word "discretion" as limited to sound discretion, a discre-
tion which is not exercised arbitrarily.
. . . except to the extent that (1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2)
agency action is committed to agency discretion by law. RIGHT OF RE-
VIEW-A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant stat-
ute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.
As originally enacted, Administrative Procedure Act 10, 60 Stat. 243 (1946) provided:
Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review, or (2) agency action
is by law committed to agency discretion, (a) Right of Review-Any person
suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any relevant statute, shall be
entitled to judicial review thereof.
46. 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, 80-87 (1958), as supplemented
15-30 (1965).
47. Id. at 80.
48. See generally, Davis, supra note 45 at Supp. 21-22.
49. See, e.g. 15 U.S.C. 78u(a) which provides:
The Commission may, in its discretion, make such investigations as it deems
necessary to determine whether any person has violated or is about to violate
any provision of this chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder...
See also 15 U.S.C. 78u(e) which provides:
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or
about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a
violation of the provisions of this chapter, or of any rule or regulation there-
under, it may in its discretion bring an action in the proper district court...
50. Berger, "Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis," 78 Yale L.J. 965 (1969).
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An arbitrary finding is outside the administrative discretion
conferred by the statute, an officer exceeds his authority by
making a determination which is arbitrary or capricious; dis-
cretion does not extend to arbitrary and unreasonable action. 51
Under this interpretation, section 10 would not preclude judicial re-
view of the Commission's proxy determinations if there was evidence
that the Commission had acted arbitrarily.
The Court of Appeals seems to have adopted an analysis consistent
with Berger. Although the court did not expressly hold that the Com-
mission had acted arbitrarily or abused its discretion, it noted that the
Commission had been accused of many "procedural sins" in its regu-
lation of proxies, many of which, the Court of Appeals believed could
be curtailed or eliminated through judicial review. A list of these "pro-
cedural sins" would include (1) approving management's decision to
omit a shareholder's proposal without requiring management to show
that it had carried the burden of proof; (2) allowing non-lawyers to
decide complex legal problems raised in proxy disputes; and (3) af-
fording inconsistent treatment to similar factual situations for no ap-
parent reason. 2 These practices, the court stated, "encourages man-
agement to file shotgun objections to a shareholder proposal, urging
every mildly plausible legal argument in the hope that the Commission
will accept one of them."5  The result of this approach would be that
the shareholder would not know for what reason his proposal had been
rejected and therefore would be at a loss about where to start to cure
the defect. The court concluded:
Viewed in this light, "discretion" can be merely another mani-
festation of the venerable bureaucratic technique of exclusion
by attrition, of disposing of controversies through calculated
non-decisions that will eventually cause eager supplicants to
give up in frustration and stop bothering the agency. 54
By permitting judicial review in these circumstances the court rea-
soned that it was assuring that the investing public could obtain, "vig-
orous, efficient, and evenhanded implementation of the concepts of
corporate democracy embodied in the proxy rules." 55
Having decided that the Court of Appeals could review an arbitrary
determination not to take action, the court proceeded to establish a
limit on review because,
51. Id. at 968-69.
52. 432 F.2d at 674, see also, Clusserath n. 34, supra, at 37.
53. See Clusserath n. 34, supra, at 43.
54. 432 F.2d at 674.
55. Id.
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[N]ot all proxy proposals can or should be given detailed con-
sideration by the full Commission, and even the boldest advocates
of judicial review recognize that the agencies' internal manage-
ment decisions and allocations of priorities are not proper subject
of inquiry by the courts.56
The court indicated that this case did not fall into that category.
Rather the court found this case to be one where "the full Commission
has exercised its discretion to review this controversy, and . . . it has
ostensibly acted in accord with a very dubious legal theory."5  It
thus appears that the court deems review proper only where the Com-
mission has itself acted and where this action is predicated on a legal
theory. The scope of review will apparently be limited in such a case
to the appropriateness of the Commission's interpretation of the legal
theory involved.
The extent to which the full Commission actually made a legal de-
termination in the instant case is not clear. The facts do not indicate
that the full Commission ever considered the merits of the petitioner's
proposal. At most there was a ratification of the staff position which
ratification may or may not have been based on an approval of the
staffs interpretation of the proxy rules. It was probably for this rea-
son that the court remanded the cause to the Commission to make this
legal determination. Even though the court stated that review de-
pended upon the Commission deciding to review a staff position, on
the basis of this case it appears that any time the Commission reviews
a staff decision on a no action letter judicial review of the legal prin-
ciples may be applicable.
Nevertheless, stating again that "among the chief purposes of section
14(a) is the protection of investors; which certainly implies the avail-
ability of judicial relief to achieve that result,' '5 the court concluded
that partial review of the merits of the controversy would not project it
into an area which was committed by law to agency discretion.
Having decided the jurisdictional issues the court afforded the lim-
ited review it had held appropriate to the merits of the petitioner's pro-
posal. The Medical Committee contended that its resolution could
not, consistently with the Congressional intent underlying section
14(a), be properly deemed a proposal which was either motivated by
general political and moral concerns, or related to the conduct of
Dow's ordinary business operations. Because the Commission had
56. Id.
57. Id. at 675.
58. Id. at 675-76.
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not addressed itself to any possible grounds for allowing Dow to ex-
clude the Medical Committee's proposal, and because there was noth-
ing in the record to indicate how it had reached the result it had, the
court remanded the controversy "for a more illuminating considera-
tion and decision."5  The court then proceeded to explain its diffi-
culties with the position taken by Dow and apparently ratified by the
Commission.
After a review of the development of the proxy rules in general, and
the permissible exclusions under Rule 14a-8(c) (2)60 and 8(c)
(5)61 in particular, the court determined that the two exceptions were,
on their face, consistent with the legislative purpose underlying section
14(a). The court noted that proxy solicitations were intended by
Congress to enhance corporate democracy, not provide a forum for ir-
relevant matters or involve shareholders in the clearly daily business
operations of the company. However, the court noted that when the
two exclusions are broadly applied, they could be construed to permit
the exclusion of practically any shareholder proposal on the grounds
of being either too general or too specific.
The court considered the arguments, advanced by Dow, in favor of
exclusion of the proposal under 14a-8(c)(5) "2 which permits man-
agement to exclude shareholder's proposals which relate to ordinary
business operations. Dow contended that the decision to manufacture
a product rests with management, and to amend the Certificate of In-
corporation to permit shareholders to challenge that determination
would violate the state statute under which the company is incorpo-
rated. The court pointed out that the Delaware General Corporation
law provides that a company's Certificate of Incorporation may be
amended to "change, substitute, enlarge or diminish the nature of the
company's business." 3 Since Dow did not suggest why this provision
is inapplicable to the present case or what law the proposal violated,
the court believed it was highly questionable whether Dow had sus-
tained the burden of proof necessary to support exclusion under 14a-
8(c)(5).
Turning to the arguments advanced in favor of exclusion under Rule
14a-8 (c) (2),64 the court noted that the counsel's arguments con-
sisted of a "fundamentally irrelevant recitation of some of the political
59. Id. at 676.
60. 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(c)(2), n. 4, supra.
61. 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(c)(5), n. 4, supra.
62. Id.
63. Chapter 1, Title 8 Delaware Code 242(a) (2), 242(d) (1968).
64. 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(c)(2).
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protests which had been directed at the company because of its manu-
facture of napalm," 65 followed by the conclusion that management
was, therefore, entitled to exclude the Medical Committee's proposal.
The court did not stop there but indicated that an interpretation of
Rule 14a-8(c)(2) which permitted omission of the proposal as one
motivated primarily by general political or social concerns might well
conflict with the Congressional intent underlying section 14a of the
Act.66 The court implied that the Rule would have to be directed at
political or social activity which was beyond the scope of the corpora-
tion's control to remain consistent with section 14a of the Securities
Exchange Act.67
The court concluded that as long as the proposal was consistent with
applicable state law, the fact that it related to a more socially responsi-
ble, but less profitable, company policy would not render the pro-
posal excludable under Rule 14a-8(c)(2).
However, the court also noted that here the company's own publi-
cations proclaimed that the decision to continue to manufacture na-
palm was made not because of business considerations but in spite of
them. Dow indicated that political and moral considerations had in-
fluenced its decision to manufacture napalm despite significant busi-
ness considerations which militated against it.68  Noting that the
control of great corporations by a very few persons was the abuse at
which Congress struck in enacting section 14a, the court concluded
that it could scarcely be argued "that management is more qualified or
more entitled to make these kinds of decisions than the shareholders
who are the true beneficial owners of the corporation." 9 It appears,
therefore, that the court is recommending an attack on the Commis-
sion's interpretation of Rule 14a-8 (c) (2), and thereby supporting
political and social action by shareholders where that action is within
the corporation's control and not in conflict with applicable state law.
THOMAS J. MONTGOMERY
65. 432 F.2d at 680.
66. Id.
67. This distinction was made by Professor Bayne in his article "The Basic Ra-
tionale of Proper Subject" where he stated:
If the Commission meant merely to exclude the airing of political views, or
the use of a proxy statement as a forum for the spread of a religion, or the
like, it did not say so. If it meant to prohibit the shareholders from formu-
lating corporate policies in regard to basic moral issues, important social
questions, broad economic programs or similar causes it was flatly out of
order.
34 Univ. of Detroit L.J. 575, 602 (1957).
68. 432 F.2d at 681.
69. Id.
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